Version
PUT

Replace a group's members

/v1/groups/{group}/members in the Groups API.

curl -X PUT https://api.subscriby.net/v1/groups/$GROUP_ID/members \  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUBSCRIBY_TOKEN" \  -H "Idempotency-Key: $(uuidgen)" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"user_ids": ["2a91c4e7-6f38-4b52-8e0d-9c1a7b3f5d80", "4b8e2f6a-1c3d-4e5f-9a7b-8c9d0e1f2a3b"]}'

This is a sync, not an add. The array replaces the membership entirely: anyone omitted is removed, and [] empties the group. That is deliberate and differs from the permission field above: clearing a group is a legitimate thing to ask for, whereas silently stripping every permission because a field was blank is not.

This is the one write in the identity surface whose tier gate depends on its argument: a sync that only removes people succeeds on any tier, and one that adds anybody needs Growth. Deciding from the route alone would leave a lapsed creator unable to take one person out of a group without deleting the whole group, and deleting is not gated, so the gate would only be pushing them toward the more destructive option.

Every id must already belong to the group's team. A group grants permissions inside one tenant, so an outsider is refused naming the offending ids; the whole call fails rather than partly applying, so you never end up with a membership you did not ask for.

Answers 200 with the group, its permissions and its member_ids. Emits group.members_synced, which carries added_ids and removed_ids as well as the final list, so an access-control mirror does not have to diff two snapshots to work out what moved. A sync that changes nothing emits nothing.

PUT
/v1/groups/{group}/members

Requires ability

The token must hold this ability, or the call is refused with 403.

Fires one event

Delivered to every endpoint subscribed to it once the change is made.

Runs the same action from an agent, behind the same ability.

Idempotent

Send the header on every call; the same key replays the original response for 24 hours.

Authorization

bearerToken
AuthorizationBearer <token>

A personal access token minted on the dashboard under Settings, then Tokens, sent as Authorization: Bearer sbt_live_…. The token carries the abilities each endpoint lists under Requires ability and is frozen to one team.

In: header

Path Parameters

group*string

The group, resolved by the route binder.

Formatuuid

Header Parameters

Idempotency-Key*string

A key unique to this operation, such as a fresh UUID. The same key replays the original 2xx response for 24 hours (with Idempotent-Replay: true), so a retry after a timeout never repeats the write; the same key with a different body is refused with 409.

Formatuuid

Request body

JSONWhat the request carries

The group's complete membership after the call. A sync, not an add: anyone omitted is removed, and [] empties the group.

Responses

200OK

The group with its permissions and members.

400Bad request

Every write needs an Idempotency-Key header. Send a fresh UUID per distinct operation.

401Unauthorized

The request carries no bearer token, or one that is revoked, malformed, or minted for another environment (an sbt_test_ token on production).

403Forbidden

The token is valid but does not carry the ability this endpoint requires; error.context.required_ability names the one to grant. An endpoint that also checks who owns a row or which tier the account is on answers FORBIDDEN, TEAM_TIER_REQUIRED or CONNECTOR_TIER_REQUIRED with the same status, and says so in its own description. On this endpoint: TEAM_TIER_REQUIRED: below the Growth tier when the sync would add somebody; a sync that only removes people succeeds on any tier.

404Not found

An id in the path names nothing the token can see. TENANT_MISMATCH: the project sits outside the token's scope:project: allow-list, or the token carries no team scope. Both answer 404 rather than 403 so that existence outside the token's scope cannot be inferred.

409Conflict

The key was already used in the last 24 hours with a different request body.

422Validation failed

The payload broke a rule, and error.fields maps each offending key to its messages. A refusal from the domain, such as a plan that cannot go on sale or a member who cannot be removed, uses the same code with error.message saying why and no fields. On this endpoint: VALIDATION_FAILED: when any id is not a member of the group's team; error.context.user_ids lists the outsiders.

425Too early

The first request with this key is still running; retry in a few seconds and the original response is replayed.

429Too many requests

The token has spent its 300 requests a minute or 10,000 an hour; Retry-After says when the next one is accepted.

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